Lamy, Laurent (2007) 6 Essais sur les encheres: Approches theorique et empirique. Application aux marches de l'electricite. PhD thesis Economie, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, ENPC p.267.
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Abstract
This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of
auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network
industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity
sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either
allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions.
After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the
analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters constitues
this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in
Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the
seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The
second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction
mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two
studies proposes a modification of this format with a final
discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those
formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful
reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness
issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the
Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative
externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one
characterizes the buyer-submodularity condition in a general
model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between
purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter
analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities
of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a
simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to
the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a
single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders'
identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model
is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed
and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for
the anglo-french electric interconnector, the last chapter
analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms.
| Item Type: | PhD Thesis (PhD) |
|---|---|
| PhD Supervisor: | Jehiel, Philippe |
| Date: | 28 June 2007 |
| Board of examiners: | Salanie, Bernard and Tirole, Jean and Jehiel, Philippe |
| Ecole Doctorale: | Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC) |
| Discipline: | Economie |
| Collection (Fonds): | ENSAE ParisTech Ecole des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) |
| Institution: | ENPC |
| Department: | Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques |
| Subjects: | 9. Sciences of Economy, Management and Society |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Auctions, Externalities, Multi-unit auctions, Combinatorial Auctions, Structural Econometrics of Auction Data, Power Markets, Explicit auctions for electricity transmission |
| ID Code: | 3797 |
| Deposited By: | Laurent Lamy |
| Deposited On: | 17 June 2008 |
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