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Strategic use of capacity and financial structure in entry games.

Laye, Maximilien (2006) Strategic use of capacity and financial structure in entry games. PhD thesis Département d'Economie, Economie, EP/X p.167.

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Alternative Locations: http://www.imprimerie.polytechnique.fr/Theses/Files/Laye.pdf

Abstract

The thesis focuses on the strategic choices of production capacity and financial structure in entry games.
Chapter 1 is based on Judo-economics analysis (Gelman and Salop (1983)). We show that there is no over-capacity at equilibrium when the entry is anticipated by the incumbent. In a first extension, firms can collude on production level. We show that this collusion induces firms to install an over-capacity, in order to be in a better position during negotiation. In a second extension, we show that a low-cost entrant may install an over-capacity in order to signal its efficiency on financial markets.
Chapter 2 characterizes the optimal capacity to be installed by an incumbent in the case of increasing demand. In this case, an over-capacity can have a double effect: to avoid or at least to delay entry, and to induce a lower capacity installed by the entrant. We show that there is a trade-off between these objectives.
Chapitre 3 presents a strategic use of debt. We assume that after entry, the incumbent and the entrant can negotiate a market exit for the entrant. By being highly leveraged, the entrant can credibly commit to trigger a price war in case of negotiation failure (by the limited liability effect), thus increasing the surplus obtained in the negotiation.
Chapter 4 introduces capacity constraints in a multi-firm, multi-plant and multi-market linear Cournot model. We prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize it.

Item Type:PhD Thesis (PhD)
Thesis Supervisor:Tanguy, Hervé
Date:October 2006
Board of examiners:Chemla, Gilles and Gromb, Denis and Ponssard, Jean-Pierre
Ecole Doctorale:ED 447 ECOLE DOCTORALE DE L'ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
Discipline:Département d'Economie
Collection (Fonds):EP/X
Institution:EP/X
Department:Economie
Subjects:9. Sciences of Economy, Management and Society
Uncontrolled Keywords:Capacity, Financial structure, Entry, Barrier, Bertrand-Edgeworth, Capacité de production, Structure financière, Entrée, Judo-economics, Barrière, Bertrand-Edgeworth

Table of content

Chapitre 1: Surcapacité de production, collusion et signal
Chapitre 2: Choix de capacité en demande croissante
Chapitre 3: Jeu d'entrée et structure financière, une utilisation stratégique de la dette
Chapitre 4: Équilibre de Cournot sous contraintes de capacité

ID Code:2039
Deposited By:Laurence Vidament
Deposited On:17 January 2007

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